Supreme Court of India: Civil AppeaI NO. 3975 OF 2010: H.P.Puttaswamy Vs Thimmamma & Ors
This suit was originally instituted on 31st March 1989 and was registered as Suit No.132 of 1989 in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) Malavalli, Karnataka. The property in question comprises approximately 4500 square ft. of land in a village by the name of Hittanahalli Koppalu in Malavallu Taluk in the State of Karnataka. The plaintiff’s case before the Trial court was that the property in question was allotted to one Gende Veeregowdana Nathegowda under a village shifting scheme. In the suit, the plaintiff contended that he had come in possession of the subject property initially as a tenant and subsequently as the purchaser thereof. He has run a case before the Trial Court that he has been in possession of the suit property for about twenty years prior to the filing of the suit. The case has been decided in favour of the plaintiff on the ground that the buyer was not present at the time of registration of the sale deed. The First Appellate Court also on the whole accepted the reasoning of the Trial Court.
In the appeal filed by the legal representatives of Manchegowda under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the High Court found the sale deed dated 21st April 1981 to be valid relying on Sections 32, 34, and 36 of the Registration Act, 1908 read with Rule 41 and 71, Karnataka Registration Rule 1965. The High Court observed and held: “A combined reading of the above sections of the Registration Act and the Rules mentioned above makes it clear that the presence of the purchaser is not required when the document is presented for registration before the SubRegistrar. The Trial Court has failed to take note of the aforesaid provision of the law of the Registration Act and has erred in holding that merely because the defendant was not present the sale deed in his favour cannot be taken as valid in law. The said conclusion reached is contrary to the above-mentioned provisions of the Registration Act and the Rules. As such the said finding cannot be sustained in law.
The plaintiff is the appellant before Supreme Court. In the suit, out of which this appeal arises, the plaintiff claimed declaration of himself as the lawful owner in possession of the suit property. After hearing both sides the Apex Court observed that “the plaintiff has not disputed that the vendor or seller i.e. Madegowda had executed the document (first sale deed) and we do not find any doubt expressed over his presence before the Registering Authority. No case has been made out either that the deed of conveyance carried any collateral obligation on the part of the purchaser, in this case being Manche Gowda (deceased). The plaintiff has not made out a case of acquiring title under the principle of part performance as incorporated in Section 53 (A) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. No pleading to that effect in the plaint has been made out. We find from the judgment of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court that the respective parties had led evidence of execution and subsequent registration of the deeds but the first two courts did not reject the contention of the second set of defendants (representatives of Manche Gowda (deceased) that there was an execution deed of sale by Madegowda (since deceased) to Manchegowda (since deceased). The case has been decided in favour of the plaintiff on the ground that the buyer was not present at the time of registration of the sale deed. There is evidence to the effect that the second defendant (Manchegowda) had not come to the office of the SubRegistrar at the time of execution of the sale deed. But as per law as it stood at the material point of time, there was no necessity of the presence of the purchaser at the Registration Office during the registration of the sale deed. The deed was executed by Madegowda and that aspect has not been disputed. The deed in question does not fall within Sections 31, 88, and 89 of the Registration Act. Section 32 of the said Act does not require the presence of both parties to a deed of sale when the same is presented for registration. In such circumstances, we do not find any reason to interfere with the judgment of the High Court. The present appeal is accordingly dismissed”.
